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I. INTRODUCTION
"Serving the public interest is the fundamental mission of gov-
ernments and public institutions."1 Societies expect their public offi-
cials to perform their duties "efficiently, effectively, and with integrity"
in an "attentive, fair, and impartial" manner.2 However, when con-
flicts arise between the official's private and public interests and such
conflicts are inadequately managed, it is more likely that the official
would fail that expectation,3 especially when the official is entrusted
with the power to manage people, money, and procurement.4
Prevention of conflicts of interest ("COIs") is a key element "of
an effective long-lasting strategy of enforcement and education against
corruption."' China has been exploring how to establish a system for
COIs prevention since the 1980s, when commercial activities erupted.6
The growing volume of government activities in business-related pol-
icy framing and decision-making, and the emerging private commer-
cial operations complicated the public-private interrelationship.7
Conflicts of interest became increasingly common in the public sector's
daily administration.
Although a socialist country, China operates, at its core, a mar-
ket economy. The Chinese government engages in a full range of eco-
nomic activities: it acts as a regulator, administrator, customer, and
business owner by outsourcing public contracts, procuring supplies,
1 OECD, MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A TOOLKIT 95
(2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/49107986.pdf [hereinafter
OECD Toolkit].
2 See G.A. Res. 51/59, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/5159 (Dec. 12, 1996).
3 See OECD Toolkit, supra note 1, at 96.
4 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 107 (1998)
(pointing out that "[flew activities create greater temptations or offer more oppor-
tunities for bribery and extortion than public sector procurement. Every level of
government and every kind of government organization purchases goods and ser-
vices. This makes public procurement, where vast amounts of public expenditure
come under the control of individual public servants, a prominent target for
corruption.").
5 Id.
6 Chen Shanguang (51 ,C9), Fangzhi Liyi Chongtu Meiguo You Naxie "Zhaoshu"
( MINISTRY OF SUPERVISION (Dec. 20, 2012, 9:05
AM), http://www.mos.gov.cn/mos/cms/html/3/68/201212/25705.html.
7 See Roswell B. Perkins, The New Federal Conflict-Of-Interest Law, 76 HARv. L.
REV. 1113, 1114 (1963).
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and operating State Owned Enterprises ("SOEs").S The Chinese gov-
ernment hosts various economic stimulus programs and financial
schemes within the central and local governments.' The pervasive-
ness, in breadth and depth, of the national and regional support pro-
grams has enormous impact on the daily affairs of business and
industry. 10 The increased "mobility of individuals in employment,
facilitat[es] a constant flow of individuals in and out of Government." 1'
Further, individual members of society have a deepened stake in the
private economy due to purchases of stock and bonds.12 These factors
prompt COIs to arise in day to day public administration.' 3
In order to fight corruption effectively, it is crucial that China
has a clear, systematic, and comprehensive COI management regime
in place. Corruption itself is the abuse of public powers and resources
for private gain,1 " and conflict of interest situations induce such abuse.
Managing COIs is critical to curbing corruption, as it is a forward-look-
ing mechanism to reduce corruption at its early formation stage. 15
"The United Nations Convention against Corruption ("UNCAC") is the
only legally binding universal anti-corruption instrument."'6 It re-
8 See DANIEL C.K. CHow & ANNA M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 14 (2012).
9 Chen Shanguang, supra note 6.
10 Perkins, supra note 7.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 OECD, OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Ser-
vice, POLICY BRIEF, Sept. 2005, at 2, http://www.oecd.org/governance/pem/35365
195.pdf [hereinafter POLICY BRIEF] (acknowledging the complexity induced by the
increasing interaction between the private and the public sectors: "[g]overnments
have for many years been aware of the dangers of personal bias in public decision
making. But in the past these concerns focused on traditional sources of influence,
such as gifts or hospitality offered to public officials, and personal or family rela-
tionships. Increased co-operation with the private sector in recent years has made
the whole issue more complex, multiplying the opportunities for conflicts of inter-
est, such as: A public official having private business interests in the form of part-
nerships, shareholdings, board memberships, investments, government contracts,
etc. A public official having affiliations with other organizations (e.g. a senior pub-
lic official sits on the board of a non-profit organization that receives funding from
the official's agency). A public official leaving to work for a regulated private com-
pany or a chief executive taking up a key position in a government agency with a
commercial relationship with his/her former company.").
14 Michael Johnston, The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment,
in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 985, 986 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer,
Michael Johnston & Victor T. LeVine eds., 1989).15 Chen Shanguang, supra note 6.
16 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
corruption/index.html (last visited Jul. 27, 2013).
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quires the State Parties to make a strong effort to adopt, maintain,
and strengthen systems that promote transparency and prevent con-
flicts of interest. 7 However, the UNCAC does not provide any specific
requirements or guidance on the management of conflicts of interest.,
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD"), on the other hand, has undertaken extensive work on the
issue and has developed the Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Inter-
est in the Public Service ("OECD Guidelines") 9 and the Managing
Conflict of Interest in the Public Sector: A Toolkit ("OECD Toolkit")2 °
to provide the first comprehensive international benchmark helping
governments review and modernize their COI policies for the public
sector.
This article relies on the UNCAC, the OECD Guidelines, and
the OECD Toolkit to provide important benchmarks for assessing the
current COIs management framework in China. It also compares
China's legal framework of managing COIs with that of the U.S. The
comparative studies not only provide readers with more concrete ex-
amples of the legislation and implementation of COI laws in these two
very different jurisdictions, but also help identify the weaknesses in
China's legal framework. The study proceeds as follows: Section II dis-
cusses the definition and identification of COls. Section III addresses
the key measures for managing COIs and discusses the recommenda-
tions provided by the OECD. Section IV briefly concludes the study.
II. DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION OF CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
A. How to Define and Identify COIs
Understanding what constitutes COIs and identifying them ac-
curately will be the prerequisite for the public sector to manage COIs.
While there is no universal definition of COIs, several international
and multilateral organizations have developed guidelines and estab-
lished protocols to assist in standardizing definitions.2 The first anti-
17 See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, art. 7(4),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003) (prescribing that "[elach State Party shall, in
accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, endeavor to adopt,
maintain and strengthen systems that promote transparency and prevent conflicts
of interest").
18 Id.
19 OECD, MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE: OECD GUIDE-
LINES AND COUNTRY EXPERIENCES (2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/
ethics/48994419.pdf [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
20 OECD Toolkit, supra note 1.
21 ABD/OECD ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, ASIAN DE-
VELOPMENT BANK & ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
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corruption instrument addressing COs was the International Code of
Conduct for Public Officials (the "Code") contained in the annex to the
General Assembly Resolution 51/59 of 12 December 1996.22 The Code
makes extensive references to COIs,2 3 outlining the most crucial pa-
rameters of the concept 24 and measures to address issues including
the disclosure of assets, the prohibition of accepting gifts or other fa-
vors, confidential information, and political activity outside the offi-
cial's scope of work.2 5 The OECD Guidelines provide a definition of
COs in a fairly straightforward and practical fashion: "'a conflict be-
tween the public duties and private interests of a public official, in
which the public official has private-capacity interests which could im-
properly influence the performance of their official duties and respon-
sibilities."2 6 In addition to the Guidelines, the OECD also issued the
OECD Toolkit to provide a set of practical solutions (including tests for
identifying COIs) for developing and implementing ways to manage
conflicts of interest in accordance with the OECD Guidelines.
For the purpose of facilitating the discussion of how to identify
COIs, this article introduces two hypothetical scenarios. In Scenario
One, public official Alpha has the power to influence a tender process
for a state contract to build a new stadium. A construction company
where Alpha's cousin serves as a CEO has presented a bid. In Scenario
Two, public official Beta has possession of confidential information
that belongs to her department. She is approached with an offer of
$10,000 in exchange for that confidential information. Do COIs arise
in these two hypothetical scenarios?
MENT, MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST, at xiii (2008), available at http://www.
oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/40838870.pdf [hereinafter MANAG-
ING CONFLICT OF INTEREST].
22 See G.A. Res. 51/59, supra note 2, at 3.
23 Although the references are made without actually defining what constitute
COIs. Id.
24 Dimitri Vlassis, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A Funda-
mental Tool to Prevent Conflict of Interest, in MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST,
supra note 21, at 5, 7 (2008).
25 See G.A. Res. 51/59, supra note 2, at 4.
26 POLICY BRIEF, supra note 13, at 2 (providing an example where a public official
was deciding whether mobile phone charges were too high to illustrate how to de-
fine COIs: "Conflict of interest arises when public officials have to make decisions
at work that may affect their private interests. For example, a public official with
the telecommunications regulator has to decide whether mobile phone charges are
too high - is he being influenced by the thought that one day he might want a job
with a particular company? The key question is whether a public official is in a
situation where his private interests might improperly influence the way he does
his job.").
27 OECD Toolkit, supra note 1, at 3.
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Under Scenario One, public official Alpha has the power to in-
fluence a tender process in which her cousin's company participated.
The performance of her civic duties related to the tender (e.g., the du-
ties to keep other bidder's information confidential, to evaluate the
bids fairly, etc.) could affect the cousin's company's chances of being
selected as a contractor. If knowledge of her cousin's participation in
the tender process has improperly influenced her performance of du-
ties (e.g., she did not conduct the bid evaluation in a fair, impartial,
and independent manner but gave unjustified preference to her
cousin's company), then a COI arises in Scenario One. Even if Alpha
was not influenced by her cousin's participation and performed her du-
ties as diligently and impartially as she should have, the mere fact
that her cousin participated in the tender, once known to the other
bidders or the general public, could generate distrust of the process
and shake the confidence of the public toward the Alpha's integrity
and that of her agency. This is usually defined as an apparent COI and
the differences between an apparent COI and an actual COI (and a
potential COI) will be discussed in further detail below.2 8
In Scenario Two, public official Beta has possession of confiden-
tial information and is offered a bribe to give away the information. A
COI exists because the official's performance of her civic duties-main-
taining the confidentiality of information-could affect whether she
would obtain the private gain (bribery) or not.2 9 If the official accepted
the bribe and disclosed the confidential information, this is no longer a
question of COI but already a corruption 3 0-the abuse of the official's
public role induced by the prospect of the private gain of $10,000.
Private interest is not limited to financial or pecuniary inter-
ests, or those interests that generate a direct personal benefit to the
public official.3 1 It can be either a financial interest (e.g., bribery, com-
pensation for a future position, kickback, scholarship, etc.) or a non-
financial one (e.g., benefiting a family member).32 The private interest
also does not have to be illegitimate. 3 A COI may involve otherwise
"legitimate private-capacity activity, personal affiliations and associa-
tions, and family interests, if those interests could reasonably be con-
sidered likely to influence improperly the official's performance of
their duties."3 4 A COI situation can be current (e.g., being approached
with an offer of bribe, or holding shares of a company); it may be found
28 See infra text accompanying notes 38-43
29 This is actual COI. See discussion infra Part II.B.
30 OECD Guidelines, supra note 19, at 25.
31 OECD Toolkit, supra note 1, at 98.
32 See id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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to have existed for some time (e.g., shareholding); or it can even be a
future possibility (e.g., the official may leave her current position and
work for a regulated corporation some day in the future).3 5 "The mere
existence of the other interest, on its own, may not necessarily cause a
conflict."36 Therefore, one must always focus on what the private inter-
est has to do with the particular matter that is being considered by the
public entity."
B. Actual, Apparent, and Potential COIs
A COI can be actual, apparent, or potential.38 In an actual COI,
a private interest could be affected by the performance of the official's
duties or functional responsibilities and is:
1. Qualitatively, of such a kind that it would be reasonable to
believe that the private interest could improperly influence the offi-
cial's performance of her duties. 39 Take Scenario One for example. It is
reasonable to believe that official Alpha has a sense of responsibility
toward her cousin (or what if it was her son instead of a cousin?). Qual-
itatively, then, it would be reasonable to believe that her cousin's in-
volvement in the tender process could improperly influence her duty
performance. This situation often arises with family or parental re-
sponsibilities, religious belief, professional or political affiliation, per-
sonal assets or investments, debts, etc."°
2. Quantitatively, of such value that it would be reasonable to
believe that the private interest could improperly influence the offi-
cial's performance of her duties. 4" Consider Scenario Two as an exam-
ple. Beta's surrendering of the confidential information would bring
her a large amount of personal gain ($10,000 is almost two times the
average annual income for Chinese citizens as of 201242). Other such
examples include significant family business interest, opportunity to
make a large financial profit, or the avoidance of a large financial loss,
etc. 43
35 Id.
36 Edrick Child, Senior Solicitor, Office of the Controller and Auditor-Gen., Pres-
entation to the LexisNexis Public Sector In-house Counsel Forum: Managing Con-
flicts of Interest in the Public Sector 5 (Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://www.
oag.govt.nz/reports/docs/conflicts-public-sector.pdf.
37 Id.
38 OECD Guidelines, supra note 19, at 24.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 25.
41 Id. at 24.
42 China Overview, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
china/overview (last visited Jul. 27, 2013).
41 OECD Guidelines, supra note 19, at 25.
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An apparent COI exists where it appears that a public official's
private interests could improperly influence the performance of their
duties, but it is not in fact the case.4 4 An example given in the OECD
Guidelines is when a senior official owns shares in a corporation
(which appears to be a COI situation) but, unknown to the public at
large, the official makes formal internal administrative arrangements
to stand aside from all decision-making in relation to the contract for
which the corporation is competing.4 5
An apparent COI situation can be as seriously damaging to the
public's confidence in a public official or the official's agency as an ac-
tual COI.4 6 An apparent COI should be treated as an actual one until
doubts are removed and the matter is determined.4 7 The suggested
measure in response to an apparent COI is to conduct careful investi-
gation of the official's private interest and responsibilities to deter-
mine whether an actual corruption or COI exists.4" In the U.S., the
common law has recognized such situations where there is an appear-
ance of impropriety in the conduct of government affairs and that such
situations may require government officials to disqualify themselves
from participating in decisions.4 9 In hypothetical Scenario One, the
public sector needs to temporarily remove official Alpha from the
tender process or temporarily suspend her authority related to the
state contract in order to clear doubts. In addition, the public sector
should carry out an investigation to further determine whether cor-
ruption has already occurred and should discipline the corrupt official
accordingly.
A potential COI arises where a public official has private inter-
ests which are such that a COI would arise if the official were to be-
come involved in relevant official responsibilities in the future.50
Within a COI situation, the official does not have private interests of a
relevant kind at the present moment, but it is reasonably foreseeable
that in the future the official's personal interests could become rele-
vant. 1 An example given in the OECD Toolkit is where the official
works with a close relative in the same ministry but the two have no
contact.52 It is reasonably foreseeable that a future contact may be es-
44 Id. at 24.
45 See OECD Toolkit, supra note 1, at 58.
46 See id. at 24.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 3 (2010) (showing where an official must excuse himself
from transactional deliberation if there exists a conflict of interest).
50 OECD Guidelines, supra note 19, at 24.
51 See OECD Toolkit, supra note 1, at 25.
52 See id.
2014] MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CHINA 153
tablished where one of them is given the responsibility to audit the
work of another.5 3
III. MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Managing COIs is a complex and challenging task. 4 Legisla-
tion and regulations are needed not only to define and identify COIs,
but also to standardize expectations towards official conduct and for-
malize approaches to prevention and enforcement.5 5 In addition to leg-
islation and regulations, supporting mechanisms are also needed to
train, supervise, inspect, and enforce.5 6 China's legal and regulatory
framework broadly comprises three key components: (a) articles and
provisions within laws, (b) specific regulations and rules, and (c) gen-
eral principles and requirements.5 7
In 2009, anti-corruption issues entered the spotlight. The Com-
munique of the Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the
Communist Party proposed to establish a comprehensive COI preven-
tion system.58 In 2011, the Central Party Committee of Discipline des-
ignated seven provinces/cities as experimental points for
implementing the COI prevention system. 59 Today's China has strict
legislation and regulations for COI (in administrative, criminal, and,
for most officials, the Communist Party's rules), and has established a
management system with inspection, supervision, and education func-
tions.6 0 However, compared to the U.S., the current COI management
framework in China is largely ineffective due to the insufficient en-
forcement of laws.6 1 The odds of a corrupt official ending up in prison
53 See id.
54 Song Dajun, Codes of Conduct and Mechanisms to Prevent Conflicts of Interest
in the People's Republic of China, in MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST, supra note
21, at 140, 147 (2008).
55 Id.
56 MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST, supra note 21, at xvi.
57 Song Dajun, supra note 54, at 141.
58 Shiqijie Sizhongquanhui Baogao Quanwen (4 t) I/4) [Fourth
Plenary Session of the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of China) (Sept. 15-
18, 2009).
59 Chen Shanguang, supra note 6; see also UNODC, CHINA'S EFFORTS TO PREVENT
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (2012) ("At present, extensive researches are being carried
out in the country on conflicts of interest legislation and pilot projects are
launched in 7 provinces and municipalities.").
60 MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST, supra note 21, at xvi.
61 Minxin Pei & Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption in China: How Bad is It? (Nov. 20,
2007), http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/11/20/corruption-in-china-how-bad-is-
it/34o (last visited July 28, 2013) ("Such measures are largely ineffective.., fur-
ther because the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection largely operates in
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are less than three percent, making corruption a high-return, low-risk
activity.6 2
In addition, the lack of a centralized set of rules to serve as a
convenient reference for self-policing and public monitoring makes ef-
fective enforcement less possible. The quantity of rules is inconsistent
with the quality of the rules, and they are scattered in articles and
provisions within various ethics laws, regulations and rules, depart-
mental rules and requirements, local level rules and guidelines, Com-
munist Party principles, and requirements in the forms of party
rules.6 3
A. China's Legal Framework for Managing COIs
1. Articles and provisions within laws
This category of legislation mainly refers to the provisions
within China's Administrative Law, Criminal Law, and Civil Servant
Law, outlining disciplinary punishment, employment restrictions,
avoidance of COIs, etc. The main legislation tackling COI is the Civil
Servant Law (which will be discussed in detail in this section).6 4 Other
laws such as the Judges Law (Article 7),65 the People's Police Law (Ar-
ticle 45),66 the Basic Code of Professional Conduct for Public Prosecu-
tors (for Trial Implementation) (Articles 19 and 20),67 the Audit Law
secrecy, it is unclear to researchers how allegedly corrupt officials are disciplined
and punished.").
62 Minxin Pei, Corruption Threatens China's Future, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT'L PEACE, Policy Brief No. 55 (2007).
63 Chen Shanguang, supra note 6, at 3.
64 Gongwuyuan Fa ( Ti A) [Civil Servant Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 70,
available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=4123&CGid=
(China).
65 Faguan Fa ( [Judges Law (2001 Revision)] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 30, 2001, effective July 1, 1995),
art. 7 available at http://www.lawinfochina.comldisplay.aspx?id=1861&lib=law&
SearchKeyword=Judges%20Law&SearchCKeyword= (China).
66 Renmin Jingcha Fa ( [People's Police Law] (promul-
gated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 26, 2012, effective Feb. 28,
1995), art. 45, available at http://www.lawinfochina.conmdisplay.aspx?id=13221
&lib=law&SearchKeyword=People's%20Police%20Law%20oQoo20the%20People's
%20Republic%20ofi20China&SearchCKeyword= (China).
67 Jianchaguan Zhiye Daode Jiben Zhunze (Shixing)(jR),, p fAA (rP*,kK. flf.,A g I/-fj:j ) (i ) )
[Basic Rules on the Profl Ethics of Pub. Prosecutors (for Trial Implementation)]
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Procuratorate, Sept. 3, 2009, effective Sept. 3,
2009), art. 19-20, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=7763
&lib=law&SearchKeyword=public&SearchCKeyword= (China).
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(Article 13),6" and the Administrative Supervision Law (Article 14)69
primarily address avoidance of COIs during each specific occupation
(such as judges, police, prosecutors, auditors, and administrative
supervisors).
2. Specific regulations and rules
China has implemented various regulations dealing with spe-
cific COI issues and how to manage them. These often pertain to ac-
cepting and offering gifts or hospitality, parameters for domestic and
foreign official business, family activities and interests, and employ-
ment restrictions.7 °
For example, in 2004, the Communist Party imposed strict reg-
ulations on public officials assuming post-employment positions in
business and enterprise.7 1 The Central Committee for Discipline In-
spection and the Central Organization Department issued a joint cir-
cular, instructing Party committees, governments, and related
departments at all levels not to give approval for Party and govern-
ment officials to take up concurrent posts in enterprises.7 2
In addition, China established a COI avoidance system within
its national civil service system.7 3 The avoidance system is divided
into three categories based on the nature of the conflict, the concerned
parties, and the scope of the COI. These categories are: (1) public duty
avoidance, 4 (2) region avoidance,7 and (3) appointment avoidance.76
68 Shenji Fa ( f), -h[ J)t3) [Audit Law (2006 Revision)] (promulgated by
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 28, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 1995),
art. 13, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=4980&lib=law&
SearchKeyword=&SearchCKeyword=%C9%F3%BC%C6%B7%A8 (China).
69 Xingzheng Jiancha Fa ( =E[J-iI (2010f~I)) [Administrative
Supervision Law (2010 Revision)] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., June 25, 2010, effective May 9, 1997), art. 14, available at http://www.law
infochina.comldisplay.aspx?id=8818&lib=law&SearchKeyword=Administrative%2
OSupervision&SearchCKeyword= (China).
70 Song Dajun, supra note 54, at 141.
71 YONG Guo, NAT'L INTEGRITY SYSTEM COUNTRY STUDY REP.: CHINA 2006 13
(Transparency International 2006).
72 Id.
73 UNODC, supra note 59, at 1.
74 Hsiao-his Huang, A Study of Avoidance Systems in Mainland China Civil Ser-
vants (2010). The regulations clearly define the scope of the COIs for avoidance
during appointment and also explicitly prohibit interference or disruption of the
lawful implementation of administrative authority by civil servants who are re-
lated by kinship or hometown affiliation to the appointees. However, a lack of ap-
plication procedures and administrative restrictions have been noted.
75 Id. Region avoidance prevents localized officials from growing their regional
ties and becoming corrupt. Due to the constant mobility of government officials
and their lack of understanding of the local customs and public sentiments, they
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A common weakness within the COI avoidance system is that no spe-
cific penalty provisions have been defined for government officials who
violate the avoidance of conflict of interest regulations.7 7
Although these regulations and rules lay out the detailed mea-
sures to manage COIs and thus complement the laws (which are more
general), they are sporadic instead of systematic and are often imprac-
tical in terms of implementation. In addition, China's social norms em-
phasize a harmonious relationship between people and it is not
surprising to see supervisors "being nice" to colleagues and intention-
ally choosing to overlook COIs or failing to manage COIs in a timely,
strict, or thorough manner. As a result, there has been a lack of effec-
tive implementation.
3. General principles and requirements
This category includes codes of conduct, party rules on integ-
rity, and guidelines regarding limits on economic and social activi-
ties.7" These rules are not legally binding. However, Party rules can be
powerful tools against corruption. At the end of 2012, the number of
members of the Chinese Communist Party exceeded 85 million.7 9 The
Communist Party plays an important role in preventing corruption
and managing COIs through its Central Commission for Discipline In-
spection of the Communist Party of China. °
B. Enforcing COI Laws and the Key Measures for Preventing COIs
In China, the People's Congress oversees the enforcement of
COIs, which is administered through a centralized legal framework in-
volving the police and the judiciary." Whereas in the U.S., the Depart-
ment of Justice enforces COI and civil ethics laws at the federal
encountered difficulties during work implementation, resulting in an increase in
the number of civil servants commuting back and forth between localities
76 Id. Appointment avoidance concerns avoidance of conflicts of interest in local
government agencies.
77 Id.
78 Song Dajun, supra note 54, at 141.
79 China Focus: China's Communist Party Membership Exceeds 85 Million, EN-
GLISH.NEWS.CN, June 30, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/
30/c_132498982.htm.
80 Cf UNODC, supra note 59, at 2. For example, Guidelines of Integrity issued on
February 23, 2010 to fight widespread corruption within the Communist Party of
China lists 52 "unacceptable practices" that says party officials who violate the
guidelines will be severely punished and could face criminal charges.
81 MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST, supra note 21, at xvii.
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level.S2 The National Bureau of Corruption Prevention (the "Bureau")
is a Chinese anti-corruption agency under the control of the State
Council. 3 The Bureau was established in 2007 to improve trans-
parency, combat corruption, and coordinate anti-corruption efforts
within the government.8 4 Through its website, the Bureau posts cor-
ruption-related news and allows citizens to submit complaints about
corruption and the government.8 5 Within hours of its launch, the num-
ber of complaints submitted crashed the website.8 6 The Bureau is in-
dependent of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, which
investigates corruption and malfeasance within party ranks.8 7
In the U.S., there is a series of COI statutes at the criminal,
civil, and administrative levels.8 8 COIs are an issue mainly addressed
by the various ethics committees at federal, state,8 9 and local levels. 90
At the federal level, the Office of Government Ethics ("OGE") deals
with prevention of COIs to a large extent.9 1
1. Education and counseling
Chinese officials are generally not as well aware of the impor-
tance of controlling COIs and do not receive the concept with full ac-
ceptance. There are voices within the government that oppose
introducing a COI management system. Some argue that COIs are too
new and advanced a concept for Chinese society to fully embrace.
Some critics argue that it is not necessary to introduce a COI manage-
ment system, as the Communist Party is a Party for the people and
does not have any special personal interest. Therefore, a Party mem-
82 GRECO, SECOND ROUND EVALUATION REP. ON THE UNITED STATES OF ANIERICA
1, 25 (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evalu-
ations/round2/GrecoEval2(2005)10 _USAEN.pdf.
83 NATIONAL BUREAU OF CORRUPTION PREVENTION OF CHINA, http://www.nbcp.gov.
cn./article/English/Organization/.
84 National Corruption Prevention Bureau Established, CHINA.ORG (Sept. 13,
2007) http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/224301.htm.
85 China's New Anti-Corruption Website Breakdown As Masses Log-On, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, http://news.xinhuanet.con/english/2007-12/19/content7281144.
htm.
86 Id.
87 See National Corruption Prevention Bureau Established, supra note 84; How
China is Ruled, BBC (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-
13904439.
88 GRECO, supra note 82, at 23.
89 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:13D-12 - 52:13D-28, 5:12-117.1 (West 2006); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 15.301 - 15.310; 2009 Mass. Acts ch. 28, § 12; VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-
3100 (West 2008).90 Cf GRECO, supra note 82, at 23.
91 Id.
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ber will not face any COIs. Moreover, China already has comprehen-
sive sets of integrity and self-discipline rules, so there is no need to
establish a similar, paralleled system. Others argue that it is too early
to introduce a COI management system because China is still at an
early stage of socialism and is not mature enough to implement such a
system. Some officials argue that COI prevention is an invention of the
western society and does not suit China, whose culture is completely
different. Additionally, there are those who argue that the attempt to
introduce a COI management system will face too many obstacles as
too many public officials have stakes involved and will prevent imple-
mentation of such mechanisms.9 2
Despite the opposition, there have been attempts at establish-
ing a "moral education" in China.9 3 While education is extremely im-
portant to clear up the misunderstandings just mentioned, the
educational programs in China nowadays still tend to be a mere for-
mality, catering to the call from the central government.9 4 There is no
standardized systematic training program for new public officials and
it is uncertain as to the content, format, and regularity with which
agencies and departments train their new and old officials. Moreover,
the current educational programs generally emphasize anti-corruption
without incorporating a distinct component of COI prevention. Com-
pared with China, the U.S. has a much more standardized and system-
atic set of educational requirement for public officials on COI
prevention. 95
In the U.S., all federal executive branch employees are re-
quired by regulation to receive an initial ethics orientation within 90
days of entering the federal government.9 6 High and mid-level execu-
tive branch employees are, in addition, required to receive subsequent
annual ethics training.97 State officials are also required to receive
training (though individual states can have different training pro-
grams with differing duration, form, and regularity).9 s Comprehensive
guides are available at both federal and state levels to help public offi-
cials evaluate COI situations and take appropriate action. 99
92 Chen Shanguang, supra note 6.
93 Sir Tim Lankester, Conflict of Interest: A Historical and Comparative Perspec-
tive, in MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST, supra note 21, at 28.
94 See id.
95 See 5 C.F.R. §§ 2638.703 - 705 (2013).
96 5 C.F.R. § 2638.703 (2013).
97 5 C.F.R. § 2638.704 (2013); 5 C.F.R. § 2638.705 (2013).
98 See id.
99 See U.S. OFFICE OF GOV'T ETHICS, EMP. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (OCT 14, 2013)
available at http://www.oge.govALaws-and-Regulations/Employee-Standards-of-
ConductlEmployee-Standards-of-Conduct.
2014] MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CHINA 159
Take the State of California as an example: its Attorney Gen-
eral's Office issued a guide to "assist government officials in complying
with California's conflict-of-interest laws and to assist the public and
the news media in understanding these laws so that conflict-of-inter-
est situations can be monitored and avoided." 1 0 The 126-page Guide
contains 15 chapters, introducing the conflicts of interest and disquali-
fication provisions under California's Political Reform Act of 1974, as
well as the common law doctrine against COIs.1 ° 1 The Guide also in-
structs the state officials and employees on how to deal with economic
disclosure and campaign contributions and specifies the limitations on
post-governmental employment, etc.10 2 The Guide also contains an is-
sue spotter checklist and a step-by-step checklist to help public offi-
cials identify COI situations with detailed instructions:1
0 3
" Step 1: Is a public official involved?
" Step 2: Is the official making, participating in the making
of, or using his or her official position to influence the mak-
ing of a governmental decision?
* Step 3: Does the public official have one of the qualifying
types of economic interest?
" Step 4: Is the economic interest directly or indirectly in-
volved in the governmental decision?
* Step 5: Will the governmental decision have a material fi-
nancial effect on the public official's economic interests?
* Step 6: Is it reasonably foreseeable that the economic inter-
est will be materially affected?
* Step 7: Is the effect of the governmental decision on the
public official's economic interests distinguishable from its
effect on the general public?
* Step 8: Despite a disqualifying conflict of interest, is the
public official's participation legally required?
In China, public officials cannot find a similar guide to assist
them in understanding and complying with COI laws and regulations.
Nor do third parties have a benchmark against which to evaluate the
behavior of a public official. China does not have government organs
that provide ethics counseling, unlike the United States, where coun-
seling is provided by designated oversight agencies or ethics officials.
Without a consultant, COI training, or workshops, public officials do
not have access to an open forum where COI issues can be discussed.
100 CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 49, at 3.
101 See id. at 6.
102 See id. at 35.
103 Id. at 1-2.
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Bearing in mind that China has harsh penalties on corruption,' °4 pub-
lic officials are more likely to keep emerging COIs to themselves even
when they have identified such situations.
2. Declaration of assets
On May 28, 2013, China Daily published an article reporting
that "China is considering improving the method used for asset decla-
ration, as a research report has revealed that the deterrence power of
the current system is not strong."' 5 This article is misleading in vari-
ous ways. The expert 10 6 commented that "although the country issued
a regulation on property declaration in 1995, the stipulations need to
be improved."' v
The earliest property declaration regulation in China is the
Rule on the Reporting of Personal Information by Senior Public Offi-
cials issued in 2010.108 This rule requires public officials to report 14
relevant pieces of private information, including personal income,
properties and investments of the official and his/her spouse and chil-
dren who live with the official, and the official's and his/her children's
marital status.' 0 9 However, the reported information is not "declared"
(as claimed) or disclosed to the public, and such disclosure is not re-
quired under the Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the
Disclosure of Government Information." 0
The U.S. disclosure system is one of strictly centralized, com-
pliance-based ethics management, with the primary purpose of ensur-
104 See e.g., China Not to Drop Death Penalty for Corruption Crimes, PEOPLE'S
DAILY ONLINE, (Sept. 29, 2010, 7:53AM), http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/
90785/7153588.html.
105 Zhao Yinan, Asset Declaration System to be Improved, CHINA DAILY, http:ll
www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-05/28/content_16538330.htm (last updated
May 5, 2013).
106 Id. (identifying the expert as a professor at the Party School of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China).
107 Id.
108 Guanyu Lingdao Ganbu Baogao Geren Youguan Shixiang De Guiding
(Rt) [The Rule on the Reporting of Personal In-
formation by Senior Public Officials] (promulgated by Gen. Office of the Commu-
nist Party of China & Gen. Office of the St. Council, May 26, 2010, effective
May 26, 2010), art. 3-4, http://www.gov.cnjrzg/2010-07/11/content_1651255.htm
(China).109 Id.
110 Zhengfu Xinxi Gangkan Tiaoli ( =_ [Regulation
on the Disclosure of Government Information] (promulgated by St. Council, Apr. 5,
2007, effective May 1, 2008) http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&
id=6011&CGid (China) (Art. 2 of the Regulation limits the scope of the disclosure
to information obtained during the performance of public duties).
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ing transparency and prevention of COIs.1 11 The set-up of the system
reinforces that purpose, as functions of declaration compliance and
COI identification are separated from those of verification and crime
detection.1 12 In the U.S., individuals in the most senior positions at
the federal level are required to file a personal financial disclosure re-
port, and the general public has access to the disclosed information. 113
At the State level, similar disclosure requirements apply. For
example, in the Commonwealth of Virginia, the State and Local Gov-
ernment Conflict of Interests Act requires that Virginia governmental
officers and employees disclose their financial interests pertaining to
real estate, business interests, gifts, travel, liabilities, directorships,
and other matters depending on the office or employment of the occu-
pant.1 1 4 These disclosure statements are available for review by the
public. 1 5 According to the disclosure report, subsequent steps may
need to be taken to address actual COIs or potential COIs, such as
prosecution, administrative sanction, divestiture of an asset, or resig-
nation from an outside position." 6
3. Avoidance
Chapter XI of the Civil Servant Law in China deals with avoid-
ance (and the exchange of personnel, including transfer of position,
and temporarily assuming a leadership position in an inferior en-
tity).1 1 7 Article 68 of the Civil Servant Law (in Chapter XI) prescribes
that:
Where there is such relationship as husband and wife,
lineal descent, collateral consanguinity within three gen-
erations or close affinity between civil servants, the per-
1 OECD, ASSET DECLARATIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS: A TOOL TO PREVENT COR-
RUPTION 29 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/47489446.
pdf.
112 Id.
113 GRECO, supra note 82, at 24.
114 Commonwealth of Virginia, Conflict of Interest, http://www.commonwealth.vir-
ginia.gov/stategovernment/Conflict/conflict.cfm (last visited Jul. 28, 2013).
115 Id.
116 GRECO, supra note 82, at 24.
117 Civil Servant Law, supra note 64; also see UNODC, supra note 59 (Other laws
and regulations dealing with COIs in China include the Judges Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, the Audit Law of the People's Republic of China, the Law
of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Supervision, the Securities
Law of the People's Republic of China, and the Regulations on the Executives of
State-owned Enterprises for Performing Management Duties with Integrity also
prescribe the correct exercise of official power and voluntary avoidance of COIs by
different professionals. However, this study does not cover the COI provisions in
these regulations.)
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sons concerned shall not assume posts immediately
subordinate to the same leading member in the same or-
gan or hold posts with an relation of immediate superior
and subordinator, or take such work as organization,
human resource, disciplinary investigation, supervision
and inspection auditing and finance in the organ where
one party concerned holds a leading post.
Where there is any need to avoid taking posts due to the
peculiarities of region or work features, the avoidance
shall be decided by the administrative department of
public security above the provincial level. 118
Article 68 aims to prevent and manage conflicts of interest
originated from family ties. However, there are several problems with
this provision. First, it does not provide a clear definition or scope of
the term "same organ." The ambiguity of this term leaves room for
interpretation and affects the implementation of avoidance provisions.
Second, it deals with such relationships existing in the same organ but
does not clearly prohibit such relationships from existing cross-level or
cross-department. Third, the second half of Article 68 provides an out-
let for the restriction and makes it difficult to oversee whether this
exception is being used in moderation or whether it is being abused.
In addition to family ties, the Civil Servant law also requires"regional avoidance." Article 69 requires avoidance in situations
"[w]here a civil servant assumes the leading post of an organ at the
township level or county level or the relevant department thereof." 9
Article 69 addresses cross-department COIs but does not explicitly
prohibit COI situations above the county level.
Article 70 of the Civil Servant Law seems to be a catch-all pro-
vision and requires avoidance in general COI situations, including "(1)
[wihen any of his personal interests is involved; (2) [w]hen any of the
interests of his relatives as described in paragraph 1 of Article 68 of the
present Law is involved; or (3) [a]ny other circumstance that may have
any impact on the impartiality of duty performance." (emphasis ad-
ded). 120 This provision potentially covers a broad range of COI situa-
tions and is crucial in filling in the gaps of Articles 68 and 69.
However, the term "interests" is not defined in the Law.
Article 71 sets out the procedure for implementing the avoid-
ance provisions.1 According to Article 71, the procedure will only betriggered when there is a report of a COI occurring, either submitted
118 Civil Servant Law, supra note 64, art. 68.
119 Id. art. 69.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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by the official herself, or an interested party, or any other person. 12 2
As mentioned previously, China's government agencies do not system-
atically contain an integrity office or ethics officer where consultation
service can be provided, and the Civil Service Law does not provide a
clear definition on key terms such as "same organ" or "interests." As
COIs can be extremely complicated, it is often hard for a public official
or the general public to identify situations that an official should
avoid. As a result, the number of self-initiated reports of COls or re-
ports from other people (whether an interested party or the general
public) is not in proportion with the frequency of situations where
COIs actually exist.
4. Restriction of activities
The UNCAC spots some areas that are at risk for COIs. The
UNCAC requires State parties to endeavor to establish measures and
systems requiring public officials to make declarations to appropriate
authorities regarding, at a minimum: (1) their outside activities, (2)
employment, (3) investments, (4) assets, and (5) substantial gifts or
benefits, from which a COI may result with respect to their functions
as public officials. 1 23 In comparison, the OECD provides an open-en-
ded checklist for identifying "at-risk" areas for COls. These areas are:
(1) additional ancillary employment, (2) inside information, (3) con-
tracts, (4) official decision making, (5) policy advising, (6) gifts and
other forms of benefit, (7) personal, family and community expecta-
tions and opportunities, (8) outside concurrent appointments, and (9)
business or NGO activity after leaving public office.1 2 4
The Chinese laws and regulations set detailed and specific lim-
its to the exercise of power. It is generally required by the Constitution
that "[tihe people administer state affairs and manage economic, cul-
tural, and social affairs through various channels and in various ways
in accordance with the law."1 25 In addition, many provinces have is-
sued measures to restrict administrative discretionary power. 12 6 Arti-
122 Id. art. 71. (China's Criminal Law also prohibits retaliation against informants
or accusers. Art. 254 prescribes that "[wiorkers of state organs who abuse their
authority by retaliating against or framing accusers, petitioners, criticizers, or in-
formants, in the name of conducting official business, are to be sentenced to two
years or less in prison or put under criminal detention. If the case is serious, they
are to be sentenced to two to seven years in prison.").
123 G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 17, art. 8.
124 See OECD Toolkit, supra note 1, at 28-31.
125 XIANFA art. 2, § 1 (1982) (China).
126 See Hunan Sheng Guifan Xingzheng Cailiang Quan Banfa [Measures for Reg-
ulating Administrative Discretion] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Provin-
cial People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2009, effective April 17, 2010) (Gazette of Hunan
Province); see also Liaoning Sheng Guifan Xingzheng Cailiang Quan Banfa [Mea-
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cle 397 of China's Criminal Law also criminalizes "[s]tate personnel
who abuse their power or neglect their duties, causing great losses to
public property and the state's and people's interests" and impose "not
more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal deten-
tion; and when the circumstances are exceptionally serious, not less
than three years and not more than seven years of fixed-term
imprisonment." 12 7
5. Other measures to prevent COIs
In addition to legislation and regulations, there are many other
key measures to prevent COIs, such as adequate compensation for
public officials, splitting of decision-making, job rotation in critical
posts, 128 fair appointment or promotion mechanism based on merits
and integrity, efficient management and leadership, and oversight by
the civil society organizations and independent press, transparency. 2 9
Unlike the U.S., where there is a stronger advocacy from the civil soci-
ety and close oversight from independent press and the general public,
China's COI management framework is part of a top-down style anti-
corruption mechanism. 3 ° Although China has put in place a legal sys-
tem to deal with COIs and has a strong push from the central govern-
ment to fight corruption, it does not have adequate oversight from the
civil society or media, nor does it have enough transparency to ensure
public access to relevant information.1 3 '
C. The OECD recommendations for managing COIs
The OECD provides a unique policy instrument for decision-
makers to review existing solutions and modernize mechanisms in line
sures for Regulating Administrative Discretion] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Provincial People's Cong., Jan. 20, 2011, effective Feb. 20, 2011) (Gazette
of Liaoning Province).
127 Xing Fa (lJ;) [Criminal Law] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), (China) available at http://www.law
infochina.com/display.aspx?id=354&lib=law&SearchKeyword=criminal%201aw&
SearchCKeyword=.
128 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 4 ("Experience shows that an adequately re-
munerated civil service is by and large more likely to be immune to corruption.
Preventive measures such as: splitting of decision-making, requiring important
decision to be taken by more than one person, job rotation in critical posts, regular
declaration of assets by more senior officials and subsequent inspection of the in-
formation provided have proven effective.").129 See Lankester, supra note 93, at 15.
130 See Ting Gong, More Than Mere Words, Less Than Hard Law: A Rhetorical
Analysis of China's Anti-Corruption Policy, 27 PuB. ADMIN. Q., 159, 182 (2003).
131 See Dai Changzheng, Corruption and Anti-Corruption in China: Challenges
and Countermeasures, 3 J. INT'L Bus. ETHICS 58, 65, 68 (2010).
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with good practices in OECD countries. 13 2 The proposed measures are
intended to reinforce each other to provide a coherent and consistent
approach to managing COI situations, 133 but can also be useful for the
Chinese government to incorporate into its COI management mecha-
nism. The key recommendations for managing COI include the
following.
1. Identify relevant conflicts of interest situations
While most countries have developed legislation and preven-
tive measures for post-public employment, the prohibitions are mostly
general and rarely tailored toward specific risk areas.1 3 1 Moreover, as
previous discussion about China illustrates, implementation mecha-
nisms often tend to be weak. 135 Measures for supporting, tracking, and
ensuring the implementation of decisions on new employment are ei-
ther lacking or inconsistent.' 3 6 The OECD recommends that govern-
ment provide a clear and realistic description of what circumstances
and relationships can lead to a COI situation, and ensure that its COI
policy is supported by organizational strategies and practices to help
identify concrete COI situations.137 The U.S. Office of Government
Ethics has done impressive work in incorporating a range of examples
of private interests into its Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employ-
ees of the Executive Branch ("Standards").' 3 1 China's legislation and
regulations have provided necessary definitions. However, there is a
lack of concrete examples to help identify COIs and it is not clear to
what extent public officials are trained on how to avoid COIs.' 3 9
2. Establish procedures for identifying, managing, and resolving
COI situations
The purpose of establishing such procedures is twofold. First, it
is to help ensure that public officials know what is required of them so
that they can efficiently identify COIs and promptly disclose relevant
information; and second, to set clear rules on what is expected of them
132 OECD Guidelines, supra note 19, at 40.
133 OECD Toolbox, supra note 1, at 100.
134 MANAGING CONFLICT OF INTEREST, supra note 21, at xv.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 POLICY BRIEF, supra note 13, at 6.
138 Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 76 Fed.
Reg. 38, 547 (July 1, 2011) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 2, 635).
139 Ting Gong & Jianming Ren, Hard Rules and Soft Constraints: Regulating Con-
flict of Interest in China, 22 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 1, 2-3 (2013).
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when dealing with COIs so that they can opt for positive resolution or
management of a continuing or pervasive COI. 14 °
3. Demonstrate leadership commitment
Effective political leadership is also a key component of
OECD's recommendations. Managers and leaders should take respon-
sibility for the effective application of COI policy by:
* Establishing a consistent decision-making process;
* Taking decisions based on this model in individual cases;
* Monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the policy,
and
* Where necessary, enhancing or modifying the policy to
make it more effective. 14 1
In addition to the targeted legislation on integrity, imple-
mented regulations pertaining to ethics, and formulated official codes
of conduct for public officials, the Chinese central government and
Communist Party have demonstrated a strong commitment to
preventing COIs in the public sector as part of their strong push for an
anti-corruption campaign. 142
China is often able to implement top-down policies in a highly
efficient (but not necessarily constant or real) manner. 143 As a result of
the leadership's commitment to fighting corruption, recklessly extrav-
agant spending of government officials has been significantly reduced
(at least on its face). As the New York Times describes:
Life for the almighty Chinese government official has
come to this: car pools, domestically made wristwatches
and self-serve lunch buffets. In the four months since he
was anointed China's paramount leader and tastemaker-
in-chief, President Xi Jinping has imposed a form of aus-
terity on the nation's famously free-spending civil ser-
vants, military brass and provincial party bosses . . .
Gone, for now, are the freshly cut flowers and red-carpet
ceremonies that used to greet visiting dignitaries. This
month, military officers who arrived here for the annual
National People's Congress were instructed to share ho-
tel rooms and bring their own toiletries. 14 4
140 POLIcY BRIEF, supra note 13, at 6.
141 Id.
142 Premier Vows Deepened Corruption Fight, Xinhua News Agency (Mar. 26,
2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/englis/china/2013-03/26/c_132263818.htm.
143 Ting Gong, supra note 139, at 163.
'44 Andrew Jacobs, Elite in China Face Austerity Under Xi's Rule, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 27, 2013) http://www.nytimes.comI2013/03/28/world/asia/xi-jinping-imposes-
austerity-measures-on-chinas-elite.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. There has also
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Debates never stop as to how real this anti-corruption cam-
paign is and how far it can go. 145 But what is lacking from this moder-
ation campaign is a reform in the rule of law to clean up the scattered
regulations and rules about COIs, or a reform to institute integrity
offices and ethics officials in different departments, or to impose
mandatory educational programs with a fixed course design and clear
goal-substantive administrative and legal steps to fulfill the commit-
ment of President Xi. It is still too early to conclude whether Xi's com-
mitment to fight corruption is real or whether his austerity policies are
consistent. However, based on the current campaign that has been go-
ing on for months, it is safe to say that the element of effective COI
policy is missing.1 4 6
4. Create a partnership with employees
According to the OECD, governments should ensure wide pub-
lication and understanding of COI policy through training, notifying,
and updating public officials; review "at-risk" areas for potential COI
situations; identify preventive measures that deal with emergent con-
flict situations; and develop an open organizational culture where
dealing with COI matters can be freely raised and discussed. 14 7
Such open organizational culture is largely missing in China's
public sector. As mentioned earlier, without an agency consultant, COI
management training, or workshop, public officials do not have access
to an open forum where COI issues can be freely raised and discussed.
A more common approach for the public officials to handle COs is sim-
ply to keep the situation to themselves. Therefore, it is important to
establish a supportive mechanism in China to include training and
consulting to form a partnership with public sector employees. 148 Not
only can it improve the public officials' skills in identifying, resolving,
and managing COIs, it also helps foster an open institutional
culture. 149
been a tightening of control over military license plates in order to crack down on
the abuse of military license plates by military officials as part of the recent anti-
corruption campaign led by new president Xi Jinping. The new regulation took
effect on 1st of May 2013, prohibiting the use of military license plates on luxury
cars such Mercedes-Benzes and BMWs.
145 Celia Hatton, How Real is China's Anti-Corruption Campaign?, BBC NEWS
(Sep. 4, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-23945616
146 Linda Yueh, China's Corruption Drive, BBC NEWS (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/business-23541923.
147 POLICY BRIEF, supra note 13, at 6.
148 See OECD Toolkit, supra note 1, at 107.
149 See id.
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5. Enforce the COI policy
When COIs are correctly identified, what to do next? The
OECD recommends that governments develop monitoring mecha-
nisms to detect breaches of policy and provide procedures for establish-
ing COI offenses and consequences for non-compliance, including
disciplinary sanctions. 5 ° The existing guanxi culture is often seen as a
major obstacle in enforcing COIs (and other anti-corruption) poli-
cies. "' But the anti-corruption history of Hong Kong where the society
is also established on a similar culture demonstrates that an effective
enforcement system can overcome the cultural obstacle.' 5 2
Internal control and external oversight institutions need to
work together to effectively detect COI offenses and be included in a
coherent institutional framework in COI prevention and policy en-
forcement. 153 It is also important to establish complaint mechanisms
to channel allegations of non-compliance and initiate investigations in
response.15 4 Only with procedures established is it possible to activate
them and sanction public officials for non-compliance with the COI
policy. 155
6. Initiate a new partnership with the business and non-profit
sectors
In addition to overseeing public administration, the private
sector, non-profit organizations, and media can also engage in the ad-
ministration itself (especially the private sector).' 5 6 During their en-
gagements, it is important for the government to educate them about
COIs and how to prevent improper gain in COI situations. The OECD
recommends the government take measures to maximize the benefit of
involving representatives from other sectors in the work of public bod-
ies.' 5 7 This includes engaging the business and non-profit sectors in
elaborating and implementing the COI policy, anticipating potential
150 POLICY BRIEF, supra note 13, at 6.
151 Yufan Hao & Michael Johnston, Corruption and the Future of Economic Re-
form in China, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 583, 594 (Arnold J. Hei-
denheimer et al. eds., Transaction Publisher 2009) (the authors correctly pointed
out that "Chinese traditions may also add to the current corruption. Chinese soci-
ety has traditionally been based not on legalisms, but on Confucian ideals and
face-to-face relationships of loyalty, favor, and friendship. It was in these personal
exchanges that the individual sought and found security, not in any legal code.").
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155 See id.
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COIs through boards or advisory bodies, and establishing mechanisms
to educate and prevent improper advantages gained by persons or
institutions.1 5
The experience of the U.S. in tackling COIs highlights the com-
plexity of the issue and suggests that informal monitoring by watchdog
groups may be just as important as official monitoring in ensuring ad-
equate enforcement. 15 9 Compared with the U.S., China's domestic civil
society is not as advanced. China does not have genuine NGOs, but
has established a system where all NGOs are government-organized
or government institution affiliated in order to impose tight control
over these organizations. 160 Even though the force of NGOs has grown
in recent years, a disproportionate amount of Chinese NGOs focus on
environmental issues instead of governance issues such as corrup-
tion.1 6 ' The Chinese media does not enjoy the same extent of freedom
and independence.' 6 2 They have been discouraged from exposing cor-
ruption until very recently. 163
IV. CONCLUSION
Conflicts of interest cannot always be avoided or prohibited.
However, they need to be identified, disclosed, and effectively man-
aged. Managing conflicts of interest properly brings a range of benefits
for the public sector. First and foremost, opportunities for corruption
or improper conduct are reduced. Second, effective policies and proce-
dures for identifying, disclosing, and managing conflicts of interest
mean that unfounded accusations of bias can be dealt with more easily
and efficiently. Third, the public sector can demonstrate its commit-
ment to good governance by addressing an issue that is commonly as-
sociated with corruption and misconduct. 1 4 Failure to identify,
declare, and manage a conflict of interest leads to serious corruption
and makes managing conflicts of interest an important corruption pre-
vention strategy. 1 6 5
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The mechanisms mentioned above for controlling conflicts of
interest are likely to be more effective if the society's informal norms,
codes of conduct, and conventions are supportive of the rules. 16 6 It is
hard to evaluate the presence of such societal norms in China. On the
one hand, the Chinese society has long been disgusted by rampant cor-
ruption and looks forward to a cleaner government and fairer distribu-
tion of wealth. On the other hand, as the economy develops rapidly,
and material life is greatly enriched in China, and as faith in Marx-
ism-Leninism has declined, nothing remains to take its place from the
point of view of restraining the hot pursuit of self-interest (material-
ism certainly will not).167 The tradition ofguanxi, the respect for social
relations and reciprocity, may also have set obstacles for effectively
enforcing COI policy. 161 Under this tradition, the private sector and
politicians may have a relationship where their closeness goes beyond
the appropriate limit.
China has gradually evolved into a materialistic society. It
might be difficult for an outsider to understand the popularity of civic
positions where monthly salaries are often too modest to sustain a
comfortable life. The competitiveness of civic position entrance tests is
not a result of a popular pursuit of a public service career, but of a
materialistic interest in the stability of civil servant positions and the
lucrative grey income. Despite progress in enacting laws and strength-
ening the push from the central government, corruption remains en-
demic in China's public sector.
The problem is not some inherent, immutable feature of Chi-
nese culture. We certainly cannot deny the influence of culture, but
Hong Kong sets a perfect example of how a shared value of good gov-
ernance can overcome the influence of culture, as it turned out to be
one of the most successful territories in combating corruption based on
the same cultural origin as the mainland. 16 9 Neither is the problem a
simple lack of political will. China's central government has a strong
motivation to fight corruption, as widespread corrupt practices among
public officials will further ignite the already-pervasive public discon-
tent and lead to greater social instability.17 The crux of the problem,
166 Lankester, supra note 93, at 17.
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INDEX 2013, available at http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi20l3/results/ Hong Kong
ranks no. 15 with a CPI score of 75.
170 See generally VINAY KUMAR BHARGAv & EMIL P. BOLONGAITA JR., CHALLENGING
CORRUPTION IN ASIA: CASE STUDIES AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, DIRECTIONS IN
2014] MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CHINA 171
one that President Xi will not be able to overcome during his term as
the paramount leader of China, lies in the nature of the interests that
have captured and ensconced themselves in the institutions of state
power-interests that all senior level public officials have stakes in,
and interests that President Xi has to carefully balance.1 7 1
President Xi is well aware of the public relations crisis that the
government and the Party are facing. He has promised a thorough
cleanup and has taken several steps to fight corruption and restore
public confidence and trust since he took office. 172 However, China
still has a long way to go for transparency and in its fight against
corruption.
DEVELOPMENT 228 (World Bank Publications, 2004) (analyzing the crux of the cor-
ruption problem in Indonesia and the analysis also suits the current stage of
China: "[diespite progress in enacting reforms to control corruption, corruption re-
mains endemic in Indonesia. The problem is not some inherent, immutable feature
of Indonesian culture, nor is it best described in terms of the simple lack of politi-
cal will or of necessary institutions per se. The crux of the problem lies in the
nature of the interests that have captured, appropriated, and ensconced them-
selves in the institutions of state power since the beginning of the New Order.
From that standpoint, the lack of real inroads into eradicating corruption thus far
is not entirely surprising.").
171 See generally id.
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tices, XINHUANET, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/18/c_1324
65115.htm (last visited Jul. 28, 2013); see also Xi Jinping Vows to Fight 'Tigers'
and 'Flies' in Anti-Corruption Drive, GUARDIAN, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
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